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“IDEOLOGY IN” OR “CULTURAL 
COGNITION OF” JUDGING: 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? 
DAN M. KAHAN
*
 
I. 
I will offer a critique of the increasingly popular claim that judging is 
―ideological‖ in nature.  That claim rests on a growing body of empirical lite-
rature that correlates federal judges‘ decisions with some measure of their 
ideology, typically the political party of the president who appointed them.
1
  
I‘m going to argue that proponents of this position, which I‘ll call the ―ideolo-
gy thesis,‖2 haven‘t adequately specified the mechanism by which they under-
stand values to be influencing judges.  These proponents have failed, in par-
ticular, to distinguish between values as a self-conscious motive for 
decisionmaking and values as a subconscious influence on cognition.
3
  Once 
that distinction is made, it becomes clear that the evidence cited to support the 
ideology thesis fits just as well with another account, which I‘ll call the ―cul-
tural cognition thesis.‖4  Of course, I‘ll also explain what the difference be-
tween ideology and cultural cognition is, and why it makes a difference, prac-
tically, whether it‘s ideology or cultural cognition that‘s affecting judges. 
 
*
Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  Professor Kahan delivered the 
Twelfth Annual Robert F. Boden Lecture at Marquette University Law School in October 2008. 
1. See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 831 (2008) (giving an overview of the ideology thesis). 
2. See id.  For a critical reaction, see generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pit-
falls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmak-
ing, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2009).  Edwards and Livermore raise serious methodological issues re-
lating to how proponents of the ideology thesis select and code data.  Id.  My critique raises questions 
about what exactly that data show, even assuming their collection and analysis are methodologically 
sound. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 5–20. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 21–25. 
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II. 
But I‘m going to start with a case, Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board,
5
 which I will use to illustrate my claims and make them concrete.  At 
issue in Crawford was the constitutionality of Indiana‘s ―Voter ID Law,‖ 
which prohibits a registered voter from casting a ballot unless he or she pro-
duces a driver‘s license or other state-issued ID at the polling place.6  The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the law by a vote of 6-3
7
 in a decision 
that failed to generate a majority, or even a plurality, opinion.
8
  How to make 
sense of the competing rationales offered by the Justices who voted to uphold 
the law will no doubt be a matter of keen interest for election law scholars, not 
to mention lower court judges, who will now find themselves scratching their 
heads as they try to assess what standard to apply to Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process challenges to state election laws.  But for my purposes, it is more 
edifying to consider how the case played out in the court of appeals.  The 
members of the three-judge panel that considered the case at that level agreed 
that the governing standard required them to determine whether the contribu-
tion Indiana‘s Voter ID Law made to the State‘s asserted interest in prevent-
ing voter fraud outweighed the alleged burden of the law on the right to vote.
9
  
The panel split 2-1, however, on how that test should be applied.
10
 
At least as it was decided by the Seventh Circuit, Crawford satisfies the 
ideology thesis.  The case has a clear partisan, political significance: Indiana‘s 
Voter ID Law was enacted by the Republican-controlled state legislature and 
challenged in court by the Democratic Party, which argued that the law was 
intended to discourage voting by low-income citizens, who tend to support 
Democratic candidates.
11
  In the court of appeals, Judge Posner, who wrote 
 
5. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
6. Id. at 1613. 
7. Id. at 1613, 1624, 1627. 
8. See id. at 1613 (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Kennedy, J., announcing the judgment 
of the Court). 
9. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ―the charac-
ter and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate‖ against ―the pre-
cise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed 
by its rule,‖ taking into consideration ―the extent to which those interests make 
it necessary to burden the plaintiff‘s rights.‖ 
Id. (Evans, J., dissenting) (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
10. See id. at 951–52, 956–57.  I am indebted to Linda Greenhouse for pointing out the relev-
ance of the theory of cultural cognition to the issues posed by Crawford.  Crawford is one of several 
decisions that Greenhouse insightfully analyzed in her Brandeis Lecture, The Counter-Factual Court, 
at the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville (Mar. 5, 2008). 
11. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case Challenging Voter ID Laws, N.Y. 
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the majority opinion, and Judge Sykes, who joined it, were appointed by Re-
publicans, and Judge Evans, the dissenter, was appointed by a Democrat.
12
  
Accordingly, the case fits the criteria that ideology thesis proponents use to 
identify cases that support their claim.
13
 
But as I suggested, I think the proponents of the ideology thesis have not 
been sufficiently clear about what they mean whey they say that a decision is 
―ideological.‖  This ambiguity relates to three distinct ways in which values 
might be influencing a decision like that in Crawford. 
First, values could supply a self-conscious partisan motivation for a deci-
sion.  That is, judges could be choosing the outcome that best promotes their 
political preferences without regard for the law.  This is the most straightfor-
ward interpretation of the claim that a decision is ―ideological‖ and is what I 
think most proponents of the ideology thesis have in mind when asserting this 
claim and what most people understand them to be saying. 
Second, values could supply a self-conscious legal motivation for a deci-
sion.  On one popular account of judicial decisionmaking, particularly in con-
stitutional law, there is not a strict separation between moral reasoning and 
legal reasoning.
14
  Judges must resort to normative theories to connect abstract 
concepts like ―free speech‖ and ―equal protection‖ to particular cases.15  So in 
Crawford, for example, judges would resort to values—economic efficiency, 
individual liberty, and the like—to determine how to balance the state interest 
in avoiding fraud and the right of individuals to vote, including what weights 
to assign each of them. 
It wouldn‘t do violence to language to describe this function of values as 
―ideological.‖  But it would let a lot of the steam out of the ―ideology thesis‖ 
to do so.  The normally understood significance of the thesis—its shock value, 
as it were—is that judges‘ professed fidelity to law is a conceit because ―ide-
ology‖ is trumping ―law‖ in their decisions.  That‘s the clear import of the 
―partisan motivation‖ conception of the ideology thesis.  But if ideological 
decisionmaking includes the self-conscious use of values to determine the 
meaning of the law, the opposition between legal reasoning and ideological 
reasoning disappears: at that point, the use judges are making of ―ideology‖ 
involves merely the sort of moral theorizing the law itself contemplates.
16
  In 
 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24. 
12. Id. 
13. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 839–40. 
14. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE, at ix (1986). 
15. See id. at 357. 
16. Brian Z. Tamanaha makes a similar argument in The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 
56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024747.  Tamanaha 
notes that judges have historically recognized, and recognized as consistent with principled deci-
sionmaking, their reliance on their values where the law is indeterminate.  Id. (manuscript at 10–18).  
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addition, while the moral theories judges draw on to give content to free 
speech, equal protection, etc., will correlate with their political party affilia-
tions, anyone who is familiar with, or does research on, a judge‘s past deci-
sions will likely be able to discern the theory the judge favors.  Using the 
theory, she‘ll often be able to predict that judge‘s decisions better than if she 
merely considers the party of the president who appointed that judge.  (Think, 
for example, of the theories of free speech, equal protection, and criminal pro-
cedure worked out by Justices Warren, Brennan, and Blackmun, all of whom 
were appointed by Republicans.) 
I don‘t think, though, that values as legal motivation explain what‘s going 
on in a case like Crawford.  We might believe, from reading their opinions 
and their other writings, that Judge Posner is inclined to read ―efficiency‖ into 
the Constitution and that Judge Evans, the dissenting judge, would object to 
making enforcement of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights conditional on 
cost-benefit analysis.  But that actually wasn‘t the sort of debate that those 
judges were engaged in.
17
  They disagreed not about what moral theory should 
inform constitutional review of the Indiana Voter ID Law, but about how to 
resolve certain disputed factual claims embedded in what they agreed was the 
controlling standard.
18
 
Does the Voter ID Law advance a state interest in avoiding fraud?  No, 
said Judge Evans, because there is no evidence of anyone ever impersonating 
a voter in an Indiana election.  Yes, said Judge Posner, concluding that the ab-
sence of reported cases of impersonation suggests the prohibitive cost of de-
tecting impersonators and the relative efficiency of using identification as a 
prophylactic safeguard.
19
 
Does requiring identification burden prospective voters?  Yes, said Judge 
Evans, noting the cost of obtaining identification for prospective voters of li-
mited means, particularly ones who don‘t drive.  No, said Judge Posner, not-
 
Accordingly, Tamanaha concludes, it is neither surprising nor unsettling to discover that some (he 
argues small) percentage of cases correlate with judges‘ ideologies.  Id. (manuscript at 18).  While 
seconding much of Tamanaha‘s very persuasive case, I would characterize the tradition he relies on 
as embracing a more thoroughgoing repudiation of the positivist separation of law and morality. 
17. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953, 955 (7th Cir. 2007). 
18. See id. 
19. Compare id. at 955 (Evans, J., dissenting) (―The fig leaf of respectability providing the mo-
tive behind this law is that it is necessary to prevent voter fraud—a person showing up at the polls 
pretending to be someone else.  But where is the evidence of that kind of voter fraud in this record?‖) 
with id. at 953 (Posner, J.) (―[T]he absence of prosecutions is explained by the endemic underen-
forcement of minor criminal laws (minor as they appear to the public and prosecutors, at all events) 
and by the extreme difficulty of apprehending a voter impersonator. . . . Another [response] . . . is to 
take preventive action, as Indiana has done by requiring a photo ID.‖). 
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ing that no individual voter had joined the Democratic Party as a plaintiff in 
the case.
20
 
The essentially factual nature of the disagreement between the majority 
and dissent suggests a third way in which values might be affecting their deci-
sions: as a subconscious influence on cognition.  Here the claim would be that 
Posner and Evans, contrary to the ideology-as-partisanship view, were sin-
cerely basing their decisions on their views of the law.  But what they unders-
tood the law to require was nevertheless shaped by their values—operating 
not as resources for theorizing law, but as subconscious, extralegal influences 
on their perception of legally consequential facts. 
III. 
This is an account that is suggested by the theory of cultural cognition, so 
let me now turn to that.  The phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to the 
tendency of individuals to conform their views about risks and benefits of pu-
tatively dangerous activities to their cultural evaluations of those activities.
21
  
Psychologically speaking, it‘s much easier to believe that behavior one finds 
noble is also socially beneficial and behavior one finds base is dangerous ra-
ther than vice versa.
22
  Persons who have relatively individualistic values, for 
example, tend to be skeptical about environmental risks, because they perce-
ive (subconsciously) that concerns about such risks could lead to restrictions 
on commerce and industry, activities that people with individualistic values 
like.
23
  People with egalitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and industry 
as sources of unjust disparities in wealth and thus readily embrace the claim 
 
20. Compare id. at 955 (Evans, J., dissenting) (―The real problem is that this law will make it 
significantly more difficult for some eligible voters . . . to vote.  And this group is mostly comprised 
of people who are poor, elderly, minorities, disabled, or some combination thereof.‖) with id. at 951–
52 (Posner, J.) (―There is not a single plaintiff who intends not to vote because of the new law—that 
is, who would vote were it not for the law.  There are plaintiffs who have photo IDs and so are not 
affected by the law at all and plaintiffs who have no photo IDs but have not said they would vote if 
they did and so who also are, as far as we can tell, unaffected by the law.  There thus are no plaintiffs 
whom the law will deter from voting.‖). 
21. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democ-
racy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (book review) (de-
scribing cultural cognition). 
22. See generally id.; Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey 
Cohen, Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology , 4 NATURE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 87 (2009). 
23. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The 
Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of—and Making Progress In—The American 
Culture War of Fact 2–3 (Geo. Wash. Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 370; Yale Law Sch., 
Public Law Working Paper No. 154; Geo. Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Public Law, Research Paper No. 
370; Harv. Law Sch. Program on Risk Regulation, Research Paper No. 08-26, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017189. 
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that these activities are environmentally harmful and should be regulated.
24
  
Research done by the Cultural Cognition Project, a team of researchers of 
which I am a member, has revealed that these dynamics generate political 
conflict on a host of risk issues, from global warming to domestic terrorism, 
from school shootings to mandatory vaccination of school girls against 
HPV.
25
 
Research that I‘ve done with another member of the team, Donald Bra-
man, an anthropologist, shows that cultural cognition also creates conflict 
over legally consequential facts.  In one study, for example, we found that 
people of egalitarian and hierarchical dispositions tend to form opposing be-
liefs about ambiguous facts in controversial self-defense cases.
26
  Egalitarians 
tended to believe, and hierarchs to disbelieve, that a battered woman who 
killed her abusive husband in his sleep faced a genuine threat, honestly be-
lieved she was in danger, had no realistic opportunity to escape, and suffered 
from a psychological impairment of perception; however, in a case involving 
a beleaguered commuter who killed a panhandling African-American teen, it 
was hierarchs who believed, and egalitarians who disbelieved, the parallel set 
of pro-defense factual claims.
27
 
In a second study, Braman and I, along with David Hoffman, found that 
cultural cognition influenced perceptions among subjects who watched a vi-
deotape of a high-speed car chase, shot from inside a police cruiser.
28
  The 
U.S. Supreme Court had held that ―no reasonable jury‖ could watch the tape 
and fail to conclude the driver posed a risk sufficiently lethal to justify deadly 
force to stop him (namely, the ramming of his car).
29
  But we found that hie-
rarchical and individualistic white males were significantly more likely to ar-
rive at that conclusion than were egalitarians and communitarians of any race 
or gender.
30
 
IV. 
Cultural cognition, I want to propose, might also have explained the disa-
greement among the judges who decided Crawford in the Seventh Circuit.  
The factual issues that divided those judges admitted of considerable uncer-
 
24. See id. 
25. See generally id. (presenting how these issues are shaped by individual cultural views). 
26. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2008). 
27. See id. at 34. 
28. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Be-
lieve? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 879–80 
(2009). 
29. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). 
30. Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 28, at 879. 
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tainty and turned on inconclusive evidence.
31
  Does the absence of reported 
instances of voter impersonation mean that this form of fraud doesn‘t occur, 
or only that detection of it ex post is indeed infeasible?
32
  Does the absence of 
any individual voter plaintiff in the case mean that the law doesn‘t significant-
ly burden voters, or only that the burden of bringing a lawsuit exceeds the 
benefit to any individual of being able to cast a single vote, and that therefore 
the only entity likely to sue is a collective one like the Democratic Party?
33
  
On speculative questions like these, shouldn‘t we expect judges, like everyone 
else, to gravitate toward the factual beliefs that are most congenial to their de-
fining commitments? 
At this point, I suspect that some of you are probably saying, ―get real: we 
know Posner‘s empirical just-so stories were disingenuous rationalizations of 
his and Sykes‘s selection of an outcome that benefited Republicans.‖34  That 
is, many of you, I‘m guessing, find it instinctively easier to believe that Posn-
er‘s and Sykes‘s values supplied a self-conscious partisan motivation for their 
decision, as the proponents of the ideology thesis would likely say, rather than 
a subconscious influence on their cognition.  Indeed, that‘s pretty much what 
Judge Evans asserted in his dissent.
35
 
Maybe.  But note that a dismissive reaction of that sort is exactly what 
cultural cognition would predict on the part of those culturally predisposed to 
accept Judge Evans‘s view of the facts.  One of the psychological mechanisms 
that accounts for cultural cognition is naïve realism, which refers to a psycho-
logical tendency to attribute the perceptions of those who disagree with us to 
the distorting impact of their political predispositions (the realism part) with-
out being sensitive to how our own predispositions might affect our own per-
ceptions (the naïve part).
36
  It was this mechanism, Braman, Hoffman, and I 
concluded, that induced a majority of the Supreme Court to dismiss the possi-
bility that anyone could ―reasonably‖ interpret the video at issue in Scott v. 
Harris differently from how the Court did.
37
 
I‘m not saying, of course, that if you instinctively doubt that cultural cog-
nition was at work in Crawford your skepticism proves that it was.  But I am 
 
31. See supra notes 19–20. 
32. See supra note 19. 
33. See supra note 20. 
34. See supra notes 19–20. 
35. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (Evans, J., dissenting) 
(―Let‘s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to 
discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.‖). 
36. See Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus As-
sumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405 (1995). 
37. See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 28, at 879. 
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saying that if you want to check any cognitive bias on your own part, you 
should be open to evidence that neither side in Crawford was dissembling and 
that instead both sides were subconsciously adopting factual beliefs congenial 
to their values. 
I‘ll suggest two pieces of evidence, both of which are admittedly indirect.  
The first piece comes from Braman‘s and my self-defense study.38  There, we 
actually used structural equation models to test competing hypotheses: (1) that 
subjects were basing their decisions explicitly on their values regardless of 
how they saw the facts, and (2) that they were instead basing their decisions 
on honest perception of the facts as shaped by their cultural predispositions.
39
  
We found the latter fit the data much better.
40
  If that‘s what happens when 
ordinary people have to make sense of ambiguous facts, it‘s plausible that it‘s 
what happens with judges when they have to do so in cases like Crawford. 
My second piece of evidence comes from another law review article.  In 
it, the author explicitly finds that, at least, where it is difficult ―to verify (or 
falsify) empirical claims by objective data,‖ judges, like people generally, 
―perforce fall back on their emotions or intuitions.  They practice . . . ‗cultural 
cognition.‘‖41  I didn‘t write that.  Judge Posner did, in an article published 
just a few months before he wrote Crawford.
42
 
This statement is an admission of fallibility, not a boast.  I‘m not sure 
what Posner would say if we suggested it as an explanation for his factual 
conclusions in Crawford.  But because I don‘t think he‘s inclined to be a liar, 
I find his candid admission of susceptibility to this form of bias in general 
grounds for attributing his beliefs (and Evans‘s, too) to cultural cognition in 
that case. 
V. 
Does it make any difference whether decisions like Crawford reflect val-
ues as a self-conscious partisan influence on decisionmaking—the conven-
tional understanding of the ideology thesis—or as a subconscious cognitive 
one in the way the cultural cognition theory contemplates?  I should think it‘s 
pretty obvious that it does.  Not only would the cultural cognition thesis, if 
true, spare us from the disappointment associated with believing that judicial 
disagreement stems from self-conscious, and self-consciously concealed, po-
 
38. See generally Kahan & Braman, supra note 26. 
39. See id. at 29–30. 
40. See id. at 44–45. 
41. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1049, 1065 (2006) (quoting Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 
24 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 149, 150 (2006)). 
42. Id. 
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litical disregard for law, but also it would supply us with tools for mitigating 
this form of judicial conflict.  Research has revealed a variety of techniques 
for counteracting cultural cognition.
43
  Many of these techniques could likely 
be employed by judges, who, as Judge Posner has admitted, recognize that 
they, like everyone else, are prone to adopt factual beliefs congenial to their 
values.
44
 
Does it make any difference, though, whether we call the cultural influ-
ence of values on judicial decisionmaking ―cultural cognition‖ or ―ideology‖?  
Why not see cultural cognition as simply a psychological account of how ide-
ology actually works—by influencing individuals, including judges, to form 
factual perceptions that match a contestable vision of the good society? 
The answer I‘d give has to do with the functional connection between cul-
tural cognition and the values that inform it.  I don‘t believe there is one.  
Most accounts in sociology and many in contemporary social psychology treat 
―ideology‖ as a force that reinforces a particular social structure or promotes 
the interest of some privileged group.
45
  Nothing in cultural cognition, as I‘ve 
described it, depends on or entails any functional relationship like that, and I 
personally find this sort of claim implausible. 
If, however, you also find the functionalist claim implausible, or just un-
important, and still prefer to think of cultural cognition as ―ideology,‖ that‘s 
fine with me.  All that matters is that you recognize that there is a difference, 
conceptually, between the subconscious cognitive influence of values and the 
conscious, partisan motivating influence of values, and that it makes a differ-
ence, practically, which, if either, explains judicial disagreement.  So long as 
our vocabulary brings these distinctions into view—something the dominant 
ideology thesis doesn‘t—I don‘t think what we call the cognitive influence of 
values on judging makes any difference at all. 
 
43. See generally Geoffrey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Anthony Bastardi, Lee Ross, Lillian 
Hsu & Michelle McGoey, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological 
Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility in Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 415 
(2007); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: 
Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 
(2000). 
44. See generally Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 28.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris 
Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich, Sheri Johnson, and their collaborators have identified various biases 
that judicial habits of mind appear to counteract.  See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wi-
strich, Sheri Johnson & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/lawpoliticswkshp-rachlinski.pdf; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rach-
linski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.  
REV. 1 (2007). 
45. See JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 459–65 (G.A. Cohen, Jon Elster & John Roe-
mer eds., 1985). 
